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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 07-2235
________________
AUGUSTUS C. PATTERSON,
                 Appellant
v.
GLAXOSMITHKLINE PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY;
GEORGE HANNUM; MICHAEL MANACCHIO
_______________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-04202)
District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 11, 2008
Before: McKEE, CHAGARES GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: November 5, 2008)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM,
Appellant, Augustus Patterson, appeals the District Court’s order denying his
motion to set aside the judgment filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).  We affirm.
The facts and procedural history of this case are well known to the parties, and
thus need not be restated in detail here.  Very briefly, in September 2004 Patterson, who
was proceeding in a pro se capacity at the time, filed a complaint in the District Court
alleging race discrimination against “GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceutical Company.” 
Attorney Reginald Allen thereafter entered an appearance on Patterson’s behalf and filed
an amended complaint.  At the conclusion of discovery, appellees filed a motion for
summary judgment.  While that motion was pending, the parties pursued settlement
negotiations and an agreement to settle the case was reached on August 31, 2005. 
Appellees’ counsel promptly notified the court of the settlement, and the District Court
entered an order on September 1, 2005 dismissing the action with prejudice pursuant to
Local Rule 41.1(b).
On December 6, 2005, Patterson filed with the District Court a pro se “Motion to
Formally Remove Petitioner’s Attorney from Case #04 CV 4202, Sanction Petitioner’s
Attorney, Allow Pro Se or Substitute Representation and Rule on Relief Requested
Herein.”  As the caption suggests, Patterson’s motion contained a request that the District
Court remove Attorney Allen from the case and allow Patterson to either represent
himself or to obtain “alternative representation” so that, presumably, he could pursue his
“pro se counter proposal” with counsel for appellees.  Patterson also included in this
motion criticisms of his attorney’s performance during the taking of depositions, as well
as allegations that Attorney Allen failed to provide him with relevant information and
details regarding the proposed settlement agreement.  The District Court summarily
denied Patterson’s motion in light of its dismissal of the action pursuant to Local Rule
41.1(b) three months earlier.  Patterson appealed that decision, arguing that fraudulent
conduct on the part of Attorney Allen warranted, inter alia, the reopening of proceedings.
We affirmed the District Court’s decision to the extent it denied Patterson’s post-
judgment motion seeking to remove his attorney and to the extent it denied as untimely
Patterson’s motion seeking to set aside the order of dismissal under Local Rule 41.1(b). 
Affording Patterson’s pro se filing the liberal construction required by Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), however, we concluded that his motion could also be construed
as one filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).  Accordingly, we remanded the matter in
order to allow the District Court to consider it in that light.  In accordance with our
directive, the District Court conducted a Rule 60(b) hearing to determine whether
Attorney Allen had fraudulently entered into the Settlement Agreement on Patterson’s
behalf without Patterson’s authority.  Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at
that hearing, the District Court concluded that Attorney Allen had express authority to
settle the case with appellees on Patterson’s behalf.  It thus denied Patterson’s Rule 60(b)
motion, as well as his subsequent motion seeking reconsideration.  This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
review the District Court’s order denying Patterson’s motion filed under Rule 60(b) for an
abuse of discretion.  See Brown v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003). 
After careful review of the parties’ submissions and for essentially the same reasons as
those set forth by the District Court, we will affirm its entry of judgment in favor of the
appellees.
As the District Court noted, despite Patterson’s claims that he never authorized
Attorney Allen to enter into a settlement agreement, his words and actions indicated
otherwise.  In addition to the testimony of Attorney Allen that he had authority from
Patterson to settle, testimony which the District Court found credible and was supported
by the testimony of defense counsel Berkowitz, the District Court also considered
Patterson’s actions in corresponding with opposing counsel and extending a “counter”
settlement offer of $81,902 – a far cry from the $1.5 million or even $250,000 that
Patterson claimed to have wanted and a near identical amount to the $80,000 negotiated
by Allen.  These actions certainly add nothing in the way of support for Patterson’s
contention that he did not agree to a settlement and that his attorney’s actions were
unauthorized.  In fact, we agree with the District Court that those actions support just the
opposite conclusion.  Patterson has thus failed to demonstrate that the District Court’s
decision “rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an
improper application of law to fact,” In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litigation, 234 F.3d 166,
170 (3d Cir. 2000), and we can find no abuse of discretion on its part in denying his Rule
60(b) motion.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Appellees’ motion
for leave to file Volume II of the Supplemental Appendix under seal is granted.
